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Contrary to popular assumption, the transitional period from the late Edo into the early Meiji 
period was anything but bloodless. A civil war, known as the Boshin War, ran for over a year 
from 1868 to 1869, and it pitted the troops of the new Meiji government against a number of 
adversaries, not all of whom were fighting for the same objectives. This thesis examines in 
detail the history of the Northern Alliance, the circumstances of its formation, its aims, and its 
composition. It further analyzes the terminology used by the victors in their writings about the 
war. Finally, this thesis proposes a radical reinterpretation of our understanding of the Boshin 
War, and of the Meiji Restoration as a whole. 
  
v 
Acknowledgements 
 
In Pittsburgh: Dr. Richard Smethurst, Dr. Martha Chaiklin, Dr. William Crawford, Dr. 
Brenda Jordan, Dr. Debra Cashion, Hiro Good, Zou Xiuying, Kobayashi Sachie, Tsukuda 
Kenzaburō, Alec Balian, Christy Czerwien, Jim Hommes, Amanda Robinson, Sam Zavaletta, 
Sarah Guest, Brian Portzer, and Barb Bzdziak. 
In and around Philadelphia: Dr. Hugh Clark, Dr. Matthew Mizenko, Dr. Frank L. Chance, 
Lindsey Stone, Amanda Tyska, my parents, and my students in Havertown, who bring me the 
greatest joy and hope. 
In Miyagi Prefecture: Dr. Kawanishi Kōsuke, Dr. Nanami Masato, Dr. Ted Demura-Devore, 
Mizuno Mami-san and the aptly named Aizu-san of Tōhoku Gakuin University, the Demura 
family of Sendai, and the Toda family of Ōgawara. Thankfully all of them are safe after the 
March 11 tsunami. 
In Kōbe: Tim Smith and Sara Biondi. 
Elsewhere: Joseph Davis, Jonathan Bronson, Tiffany Namwong, and Theresa & Ariele 
Hammill. 
Institutions I’d like to thank include the Hillman Library, the Van Pelt-Dietrich Library at 
the University of Pennsylvania, the library at Tōhoku Gakuin University (Izumi and Tsuchitoi 
Campuses), the Myrin Library at Ursinus College, the Gest Library at Columbia University, the 
New York Public Library, and the US-Japan Iron and Steel Fellowship for making full-time focus 
on this project possible in my second year of study. 
That’s about it; any and all errors are my own. 
vi 
 
Dedication 
 
To the people of Sendai. 
 
May their city rise from the ashes once again
vii 
 
Table of Contents 
 
SIGNATURES .................................................................................................................................................. ii 
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................................................... iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................................................. v 
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................................................. vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................................................... vii 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................................................ viii 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 1 
I. A Look at American Historiography on the Alliance and the War ................................... 4 
II. The Northern Alliance: A History .......................................................................................... 7 
A. The Boshin War: Background ................................................................................................ 8 
B. Birth of the Alliance .............................................................................................................. 14 
C. A Few Key Figures ................................................................................................................. 20  
D. Battles and Fall of the Alliance ............................................................................................ 22 
III. The Victors’ Narrative and Some of its Key Terms Defined ............................................ 26 
IV. Deconstructing the Victors’ Narrative: The Question of Sabaku ................................... 32 
V. The Victors’ Narrative Challenged, the Current State of that Challenge ...................... 38 
VI. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 42 
APPENDIX A: Articles of Alliance ............................................................................................................ 45 
APPENDIX B: The Full Invitation Message of i4/4 ................................................................................ 47 
APPENDIX C: Brief Timeline, 1868 .......................................................................................................... 48 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................................................... 51 
  
viii 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
TABLE 1.1: Members of the Alliance ....................................................................................................... 18 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“The domains of Mutsu and Dewa, presently gathered in council at 
Sendai, communicate the following to the government-general for 
pacification. Having cultivated this covenant, we desire to follow the path 
of fairness and justice, to engage in unanimous cooperation, to revere 
the imperial court above and comfort the people below, and by 
preserving the imperial land, to set His Majesty's heart at ease…” 
 
Thus begins the treaty of alliance which formed the Ōuetsu Reppandōmei (奥羽越列藩
同盟, hereafter “Northern Alliance”) of 1868.1 It only existed for the briefest of historical 
instants, but I believe that reevaluating Northern Alliance—or in the case of the western 
academic world, evaluating it for the first time-- is beneficial as it adds depth and color to a 
period in Japanese history that all too often gets short shrift in favor of discussions on various 
aspects or individuals of the Meiji era whose existence or lifespan straddles this interstitial 
period. To quote Bob T. Wakabayashi, we are in “haste to see the Bakufu fall.”2 
Furthermore, our view of the Meiji Restoration is one of unobstructed or nearly-
unobstructed change, but I believe this view would benefit from revision by looking at the 
history of the Alliance. Not only will reevaluating the Alliance better help us scholars to 
understand the state of things in this era of great transitions, I believe that it will serve to 
remind us that while hindsight may seem perfect, there is, ultimately, no such thing as historical 
inevitability. Historians often speak of this alliance as “Tokugawa partisans,”3 “diehards” of the 
                                                          
1
 Nihon no Kassen 8: Meiji Ishin 日本の合戦八：明治維新. Ed. Kuwata Tadachika 桑田忠親 (Tōkyō 東京: Shin 
Jinbutsu Ōraisha 新人物往来社, 1978), pp. 173-174. 
2
 Bob T. Wakabayashi, Japanese loyalism                                                  1759. (Honolulu : 
University of Hawaii Press, 1995), p. 6. 
3
 Marius B. Jansen, S k        ō           M  j             . (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 
334. 
2 
old order,4 or otherwise somehow opposed to the idea of imperial rule. In the pages that follow, 
I will show that none of this was the case. 
In this thesis, I will argue that the victors’ narrative of the war, and specifically of the 
Alliance and its actions and its intentions, is at odds with the reality of what truly happened. To 
that end, I will first look at the western (predominantly American) historiography of the Alliance. 
I will then offer an historical summary of the Northern Alliance-related events of the war up to 
the end of 1868, the first such summary to appear in English. I will then summarize the victors’ 
narrative on the war, and identify some of the key terms that they use in discussing those who 
were vanquished. Subsequently, I will deconstruct the major terms used by the victors in 
describing the Alliance, and look at some of the ways that the survivors of the vanquished 
challenged these terms, before offering my conclusion. 
The victors will always write the history—neither I nor all the historians in the world can 
change that. I also cannot change the fact that all the people involved are dead, as are all their 
institutions-- even the Greater Japanese Empire [Dai Nippon Teikoku] that was born with the 
Restoration. It is safe to say that these events are firmly outside the realm of living memory. 
Therefore, there is no reputation to save here, nor any honor to vindicate. Even General Shiba 
Gorō (1860-1945), a survivor of the Boshin War who lost much of his family in the fighting, 
wrote late in his life, “more lamentations will serve no purpose, nor is there any point in 
dredging an ancient grudge.” 5 As an historian I do not see myself, in Herbert Butterfield’s 
                                                          
4
 James Baxter, The Meiji Unification through the Lens of Ishikawa Prefecture. (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1994), p. 57. 
5
 Shiba Gorō,      b      A z   T   T            S  b  G  ō. Ed. Ishimitsu Mahito, trans. Teruko Craig. 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1999), p. 28. 
3 
words, as “the avenger.”6 The victors may always write the history, but I believe that we can 
choose to also acknowledge the narratives, and experiences, of those who were vanquished. 
This thesis represents my attempt to do my own small part toward this end. 
  
                                                          
6
 Sir Herbert Butterfield, Introduction to The Whig interpretation of history (New York: Norton, 1965), x. 
4 
CHAPTER I: A Look at American Historiography on the Alliance and the War 
What have American scholars said about the Boshin War and the Northern Alliance? 
There has been much written in English on the Meiji Restoration and many of these works 
make at least a passing reference to the events of 1868-1869. In recent decades, for the most 
part, western historiography seems to have followed the language of the victors. In his work on 
Sakamoto Ryōma, Marius Jansen calls the Alliance members “Tokugawa partisans.”7 James 
Baxter spoke of them as “diehards of the old order” in his discussion of the Meiji transition in 
Ishikawa-ken.8 In his work on the Imperial Japanese Army, Edward Drea calls them “pro-bakufu 
vassals.”9 Richard Storry, writing in A History of Modern Japan, says that they were “mindful of 
their allegiance to the heirs of *Tokugawa+ Ieyasu.”10 
The common thread one encounters in these works is a lumping together of everyone 
who fought against the Meiji government into one amorphous body. However, this is 
understandable, given the man who has become the face of those who fought against the Meiji 
government. This is none other than Enomoto Takeaki, a shogunal retainer who served as the 
admiral-in-chief of the shogunal navy.11 He went on to work in the Meiji government, and work 
in the development of the modern Japanese navy and in treaty negotiations with the Russian 
Empire. If Enomoto is the face of those who fought against the Meiji government, and Enomoto 
was a Tokugawa retainer, then it would seemingly make sense for those who fought against the 
Meiji government to all be “Tokugawa partisans.” 
                                                          
7
 Jansen, S k        ō           M  j             , p. 334. 
8
 James Baxter, The Meiji Unification through the Lens of Ishikawa Prefecture. (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1994), p. 57. 
9
 Drea, p. 15. 
10
 Richard Storry, A History of Modern Japan (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), p. 102. 
11
 N         ō      B, p. 198. 
5 
Despite this reductionist tendency, there are some scholars who do as certain Japanese 
scholars in the late Meiji era did and remove the issue of disloyalty to the emperor from the 
discussion. In his work discussing the collapse of the Tokugawa shogunate, Conrad Totman 
states succinctly, “Daimyo in northeast Japan put up a fierce resistance to the conquest for 
several months thereafter, but their struggle was not a defense of the Tokugawa bakufu.”12 
Harold Bolitho, too, takes issue with Jansen’s label of “Tokugawa partisans” in his 
aforementioned work on the fudai daimyo: “There is little to support a claim that *the domains 
of the Alliance+ were working for a Tokugawa restoration.” 13  He then brings up the 
enthronement of Emperor Tobu, and the creation of a new imperial court, as some of his 
evidence toward that view.14 How, after all, could an alliance that had its own imperial 
pretender have been opposed to the idea of an imperial government? 
In short, there is some scholarship out there which at least begins to look at the Boshin War in a 
more detailed manner. However, the prevailing terminology, here as in the victors’ narrative, 
hinges on the pro/anti emperor dichotomy. It bears noting, though, that this reduction is 
understandable. This reduces the complexity of the war, and the Restoration, to manageable 
brevity, and makes it easy to move ahead and talk about other things. In all of the works I have 
cited which espouse that position, the war is not the central matter of discussion. The 
discussion in these books is never centered on the Boshin War; the war is always a part of the 
story, but never the focus. While there is nothing wrong with this, it seems that as it appears so 
often in English language discussions on other topics, it might deserve further, more direct 
                                                          
12
 Totman, p. 443. 
13
 Bolitho, Treasures among Men, p. 246. 
14
 Ibid. 
6 
treatment. Perhaps the time has come, then, for a comprehensive, monograph-length, English-
language study of the Boshin War as a whole. 
  
7 
CHAPTER II: The Northern Alliance: A History 
The Meiji Restoration has been characterized by some writers as having been 
“bloodless”15 or “almost bloodless.”16 However, when we look closely at its events, and 
particularly at the events of the Boshin War 戊辰戦争 (1868-1869), we can see that this was 
anything but the case. The historical encyclopedia Kokushi Daijiten defines the period of the 
Restoration to be 1853-1879.17 Starting with Commodore Perry’s arrival in Japan and running 
through just after the Seinan War, this period includes the Tokugawa shogunate’s two Choshu 
expeditions, the fighting in Kyoto, the Satsuma-England War, the Boshin War, and the various 
samurai uprisings culminating in the Seinan War. Needless to say it was very bloody. The 
casualty list of samurai class people alone runs in the tens of thousands.18 We are speaking, 
therefore, of an event in history that was hardly bloodless. Calling the Restoration “bloodless” 
deprives it of the complexity, conflict, and color that is part and parcel of its history. One 
political entity that was part of this complexity was the Ōuetsu Reppandōmei—the Northern 
Alliance. Below I will offer the first comprehensive, in-depth summary of the Alliance’s history 
ever penned in English, starting with the circumstances of the Boshin War which led to its 
formation. 
 
 
                                                          
15
 Frederic E. Wakeman, History and will: philosophical perspectives of Mao Tse-tung's thought. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1973), p. 151. 
16
 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982), p. 214. 
17
 Kokushi Daijiten Volume 13 國史大辭典第十三巻. Ed. Kokushi Daijiten Henshū Iinkai 国史大辞典編集委員会. 
(Tōkyō 東京: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan 吉川弘文館, 1997), p. 723. 
18
 For a list of the dead samurai in this period (excluding those who died in the Seinan War), see Bakumatsu Ishin 
zen junnansha meikan 幕末維新全殉難者名鑑. 4 Vols. Ed. Aketa Tetsuo 明田鉄男. (Tōkyō: Shin Jinbutsu 
Ōraisha 新人物往来社, 1986). To my knowledge, no one has ever counted the dead people of other classes. 
8 
The Boshin War: Background 
In 1867, it was obvious to most people in Japan, including the shogun, that the system 
of a shogunate was no longer viable. Consequently, the last shogun Tokugawa Yoshinobu 徳川
慶喜 (1837-1913) resigned in late 1867 and returned his political authority (seiken 政権) to the 
imperial court.19 A myriad of different people had a myriad of different ideas about what to do 
next. Yoshinobu's understanding was that, as the preeminent landholder in Japan, he would be 
the first among equals in a new national council of daimyo that would emerge. However, the 
loosely allied Satsuma-han 薩摩藩 and Chōshū-han 長州藩 seized the opportunity and with the 
help of allies at the imperial court, engineered a coup d'etat on the morning of 12/9/Keiō 3.20 
The boy-emperor Meiji was a mere fifteen years old: unlike his adult predecessor Kōmei (孝明
天皇 1831-1867), he was young and therefore easily malleable. With the imperial court firmly 
in their hands and blocked off behind their soldiers’ guns,21 the Sat-chō clique engineered a 
campaign of terrorism22 in the shogunal heartland of the Kantō, 23 and other armed provocation 
in the Kansai region,24 designed to force Yoshinobu and his allies into military action. Imperial 
banners were prepared without the emperor's sanction and set aside for the impending 
                                                          
19
 Sasaki Suguru 佐々木克, B          ō            “M  j -     ” 戊辰戦争：敗者の「明治維新」. (Tōkyō 東京: 
Chūōkōron-shinsha 中央公論新社, 2002), p. 232. 
20
 Ibid, pp. 13, 232. By the modern calendar it was Friday, January 3, 1868. 
21
 Ibid, p. 13. 
22
 As defined by the U.S. government, “                     b   ‘      l w  l                  v  l             
persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in 
               p l     l         l  bj    v  .’” John Fay, Encyclopedia of Security Management. (Oxford: 
Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007), pp. 560-561. 
23
 Mark Ravina, The Last Samurai  T   L        B   l      S   ō T k     . (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2004), p. 
145. On the orders of Saigō Takamori, a group of men led by Sagara Sōzō 相楽総三 (1839-1868) ransacked 
merchant warehouses, burned shogunal property, and attacked and harassed the shogunate police. In March 
1868 the imperial army disposed of Sagara in short order, beheading him on charges of leading a “false imperial 
army” (nise kangun 偽官軍). 
24
 Fukushima Hiroshi 福島溥, Bakumatsu, Ishin Yume no ato k kō 幕末維新・夢の跡紀行. (Tōkyō 東京: Kyoiku 
shōseki 教育書籍, 1990), p. 163. 
9 
conflict.25 Yoshinobu sent his troops to Kyoto at the start of the new year, with a letter telling 
the Sat-chō controlled emperor that he was Sat-chō controlled.26 Understandably, the Sat-chō 
alliance did not allow this message to reach the imperial “jewel” (gyoku 玉) that they had now 
“seized”27 On 1/3/K4,28 Satsuma troops fired on the advancing shogunal soldiers, and so began 
the Battle of Toba-Fushimi and the Boshin War.29 On the second day of the battle, the imperial 
banners were raised and the Sat-chō troops became the imperial army. 30 
These banners had been prepared far in advance of the battle, without the emperor’s 
sanction.31 Historian Donald Keene’s words on these banners bear quoting in full: 32 
[T]he imperial forces were also helped by a secret weapon, the 
brocade pennant carried by imperial forces when doing battle with 
traitors. On October 10, 1867, Ōkubo Toshimichi and Shinagawa 
Yajirō (1843-1900, a Chōshū leader) visited Iwakura Tomomi at his 
place of exile to discuss the stratagem of restoring imperial rule. 
Iwakura showed the others the design of a pennant conceived of by 
his “brain” Tamamatsu Misao, and asked them to have some made. In 
Kyoto, Ōkubo bought red and white damask, which Shinagawa took 
to Yamaguchi to be made into pennants. Half the pennants were kept 
in Yamaguchi, the other half, at the Satsuma residence in Kyoto. 
 
Despite his willing surrender of power to the court, and the loyalty to the court 
(attested by the previous emperor, Kōmei 孝明天皇  (1831-1867)) of Yoshinobu’s chief 
                                                          
25
 Donald Keene, Emperor of Japan: Meiji and his world, 1832-1912 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 
126. 
26
 Quoted in Conrad Totman, The Collapse of the Tokugawa Bakufu, 1862-1868. (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i 
Press, 1980), pp. 416 to 417. 
27
 George M. Wilson, Patriots and redeemers in Japan: motives in the Meiji Restoration. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), p. 49. 
28
 Monday, January 27, 1868. 
29
 Mori Mayumi 森まゆみ, S ō      Ib   彰義隊遺聞. (Tōkyō 東京: Shinkōsha 新潮社, 2004), p. 284. 
30
 Sasaki, p. 26; Noguchi Shin’ichi 野口真一, Aizu-han 会津藩 (Tōkyō 東京: Gendai Shokan 現代書簡, 2005), p.167. 
31
 Keene, p. 126. 
32
 Ibid, p. 126. 
10 
supporter, Aizu-han daimyo Matsudaira Katamori 松平容保 (1836-1893),33 Yoshinobu and all of 
his subordinates were declared enemies of the court by simple virtue of firing back in self 
defense at the Sat-chō troops who now bore the emperor's banners. Even if they had not fired, 
there were edicts issued far in advance of the war, without the emperor’s sanction, calling for 
their armed subjugation. 34 
The vestigial leadership apparatus of the former shogunate, along with the bulk of its 
armies, escaped to Edo,35 but the leaders soon chose surrender and cooperation rather than 
resistance. The new imperial army, which was slowly growing with the addition of other 
domainal troops, had a set date for an attack on Edo, 36 but this was soon called off after a 
peace was negotiated via the mediation of British diplomat Sir Harry Parkes (1828-1885).37 With 
the peace-minded Katsu Kaishū 勝海舟 (1823-1899) in charge of the Tokugawa family's affairs, 
the official Tokugawa policy was cooperation and submission (kyōjun 恭順), so the handover of 
Edo was bloodless. 38  Katsu ordered potentially violent Tokugawa troops out of Edo by 
promising them ex-bakufu land in Kai39 and Shinano40 Provinces-- if they could take and hold it-- 
                                                          
33
 K ō   S       k  N     , Vol. 1 京都守護職日誌第 1 卷. Ed. Kikuchi Akira 菊池明. (Tōkyō 東京: Shin Jinbutsu 
Ōraisha 新人物往来社, 2008), p. 262. 
34
 Ishii Takashi 石井孝, Ishin no Nairan 維新の内乱. (Tōkyō 東京: Shiseidō 至誠堂, 1977), p. 11. 
35
 Onodera Eikō 小野寺永光, B         b k      ō    Tō  k     k  戊辰南北戦争と東北政権. (Sendai 仙台: 
Kita no mori 北の杜, 2005), p. 189. 
36
 Meiji Tennō ki, Vol. 1 明治天皇紀第一巻. Comp. Imperial Household Agency 宮内庁(Tōkyō 東京: Yoshikawa 
Kōbunkan 吉川弘文館, 1977), p.19. 
37
 Kojima Keizō 小島慶三, B          ō k    S          ō    M  j  I     w  K        戊辰戦争から西南戦争へ : 
明治維新を考える. (Tōkyō 東京: Chūōkōron-shinsha 中央公論新社, 2002), pp. 98-99. 
38
 Kikuchi Akira 菊池明, “Toba-Fushimi no tatakai kara Nagareyama made,” 鳥羽・伏見の戦いから流山まで pp. 
96-109, in S           S   ō H j        b    新撰組斉藤一のすべて. (Tōkyō 東京: Shin Jinbutsu Ōraisha 新
人物往来社, 2003), p. 101; Takano Kiyoshi 高野澄, Tokugawa Yoshinobu: Kindai Nihon no Enshutsusha 徳川慶
喜近代日本の演出者. (Tōkyō 東京: Nippon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai 日本放送出版協会, 1997), pp. 266-269; 
Totman, pp. 439-441. 
39
 Kojima, p. 95. 
40
 Ibid, p. 95. 
11 
as private fief land. Other Tokugawa troops left Edo of their own accord,41 and the domainal 
forces, such as those of Aizu and Shōnai, also headed home on their own.42 
The imperial troops entered Edo in the spring of 1868; thanks to the negotiations noted 
above between shogunal retainer Katsu and Satsuma official Saigō Takamori. The troops 
entered Edo without bloodshed. 43 However, two of the biggest enemy domains on the imperial 
agenda, the northeastern han of Aizu and Shōnai, remained unsubdued. Aizu was wanted for its 
actions at Toba-Fushimi, Shōnai for burning the Satsuma yashiki in Edo during its counterattack 
on Satsuma-sponsored terrorists who had sheltered there.44 Aizu was working feverishly to 
secure a negotiated peace, 45  but anything short of unconditional, total surrender was 
unacceptable for the imperial army.46 
To this end, the imperial government repeatedly ordered the domains of northeastern 
Japan to organize their forces and take down Aizu and Shōnai.47 From a point of view of sheer 
manpower, this makes sense, as the Satsuma and Choshu forces were tied down in Edo dealing 
with the challenge posed by the Tokugawa partisan band Shōgitai 彰義隊.48 The imperial 
government had been issuing orders practically from the very day it was founded: the first 
order for Sendai-han, chief among the northeastern domains, to attack Aizu was issued a mere 
                                                          
41
 Onodera, p. 191; Sasaki, pp. 56-57. 
42
 Ishii, p. 284. 
43
 Kojima, pp. 98-99. 
44
 Onodera, p. 189; Ravina, p. 145. 
45
 Kawabata Tahei 川端太平, Matsudaira Shungaku 松平春嶽. (Tōkyō 東京: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan 吉川弘文館, 
1967), p. 446. 
46
 Sasaki, p. 231. 
47
 Onodera, p. 189; Nakamura Akihiko 中村彰彦, Byakkotai 白虎隊. (Tōkyō 東京: Bungei-shunjū 文藝春秋, 2001), 
p. 18. 
48
 Sasaki, p. 232; Matsuo Masahito 松尾正人, Ishin Seiken 維新政権 (Tōkyō: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan 吉川弘文館, 
1995), p. 299. 
12 
fourteen days after the Battle of Toba-Fushimi.49 As time went on the imperial government felt 
it important to send a delegation to Sendai-han to ensure its cooperation. So on 2/26, Kujō 
Michitaka 九条道孝 (1839-1906), a court noble who had served as the Minister of the Left 
(Sadaijin 左大臣), was selected as commander-in-chief (Sōtoku 総督) of the Army for the 
Subjugation of the North (Ō -chinbugun 奥羽鎮撫軍).50 He was accompanied by a few hundred 
troops as well as a small staff that included both men of the court and men of Satsuma and 
Chōshū. They departed Osaka on 3/1, bound by ship for Sendai.51 On 3/18 they arrived at the 
Sendai-han naval station on Sabusawa Island, 52 and on 3/23, they were in the Sendai castle 
town and had set up a command post at the Sendai domain school; upon arrival, Kujō 
immediately issued another order to “attack Aizu quickly.”53 The next day, Date Yoshikuni, the 
daimyo of Sendai, went there, both to offer his greetings to the imperial delegation and to 
consult with them about the orders regarding Aizu.54 
Despite this and similar orders that Kujō and his staff ceaselessly issued after their 
arrival in Sendai, the northeastern domains were not eager at the thought of war. They had 
very little interest in getting involved with a war that had broken out independently of them 
and certainly did not want to see it spread to their lands, so they quickly cooperated with the 
imperial forces and sent troops, bearing the same imperial banner that Sat-chō now flew, to 
advance on the borders of Aizu and Shōnai.55 
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At this point there were limited engagements fought between Sendai and Aizu troops. 
At the same time as this low-level fighting, the northeastern domains tried to act as 
intermediaries, for Aizu in particular, in the hopes of negotiating a peace agreement. This 
period in the war’s chronology is filled with events and anecdotes that make the reader wonder 
if anyone was taking the war seriously. There are drunken Aizu pickets,56 drunken imperial 
troops rampaging through the Sendai castle town,57 Aizu troops in caves surprising imperial 
patrols,58 Aizu and Sendai combatants agreeing to shoot blanks at each other,59 and refugees 
from Edo pouring into the Aizu castle town. These refugees, who even included an entire fire 
brigade that later served during the siege, came in such great numbers that it took on a new life 
and energy of prosperity, not at all the air of a capital of an embattled territory. 60 The following 
song became popular in those days.61 
 If you wish to see a capital, 
 Come no further! 
 Watch now as Aizu 
 Is becoming Edo. 
 
In order to discuss these issues and work toward greater regional cooperation, four 
senior retainers from Sendai-han and Yonezawa-han-- two of the largest domains of the 
northeast-- sent the following message. The message invited representatives from the han of 
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the northeast to gather for a council at Shiroishi, a secondary castle town in the southwestern 
part of Sendai-han.62 
Our lords Mutsu-no-kami 63  and Danjō-daihitsu 64  have been 
ordered to form the vanguard of the attack on Katamori of Aizu. 
Lord Mutsu-no-kami has been dispatched already, but as 
Katamori's retainers have come to his encampment with a 
petition of surrender and apology, we would like to invite group 
discussion on this. Therefore we ask that you send men from 
among your senior officials to Shiroishi as soon as possible. 
 
Most of the domains of northeastern Japan, large and small alike, sent delegates to 
Shiroishi in short order. This gathering of delegates from the domains of the northeast was the 
seed of the Northern Alliance. But rather than laud the northern domains for their cooperation 
and their efforts at negotiating a peaceful end to the conflict, the imperial forces saw these 
developments as intransigence and "making light" of the imperial court.65 A letter from one of 
the imperial officers (who had already denounced Sendai samurai as “cowards”66) sent to the 
Kyoto government denounced the entire northeast as "vulgar," and said that there was "no 
choice" but to view the entire region as an enemy.67 
Birth of the Alliance 
At the same time, those southwestern troops who had accompanied Kujo and his staff 
were out of control with their conduct, according to one observer, going on drunken rampages 
and sexually assaulting women.68 This letter to Kyoto, which came into the hands of samurai 
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from Sendai-han, not only led to the assassination of its hapless author, but served as the 
catalyst for the loosely allied Shiroishi council to become the Northern Alliance.69 The Alliance 
then took up arms against the imperial army.70 Sendai, and the entire northeastern part of 
Japan’s main island, was now under the same label of traitor as the samurai population of Aizu. 
The day after the Alliance was formed, it set up a command post in the Fukushima castle town 
under Sendai leadership, and drew up battle plans against the imperial army.71 The war that 
had previously been limited to the borders of Aizu could no longer be escaped. 
Faced with this situation, Sendai lord Date Yoshikuni issued a letter on of exhortation 
5/8 to the warriors and commoners of his domain. In my opinion this aptly summarizes the 
official policy of Sendai-han and Alliance as a whole, at the time that the northern clans took up 
arms against the Meiji government’s armies.72 
Though I have obeyed the imperial order to subdue Aizu, [Matsudaira] 
Katamori has submitted a writ of surrender and apology. Though the 
myriad domains have submitted petitions, he has not been forgiven, and 
now a nameless order to attack Shōnai has even been issued. These are 
not the wishes of Sir Kujō, and this is furthermore not the wish of His 
Majesty [the Emperor]. The gang of [Sat-chō+ villains has deceived the 
imperial court, stolen political power, and there is no doubt that they 
advance their private agenda with cunning and cruelty. Therefore it is 
my intention to join the Alliance, raise great justice and end chaos, and 
sustain the Imperial land. Not only great and small retainers, but the 
common people as well, should make determination their object and 
assist me, let there not be any forgetfulness on this. The details will be 
given to you by the magistrates. 
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As we will see later, this alliance was by no means an alliance that was restricted to the 
northeastern Japanese provinces of Mutsu and Dewa. Rather, it later expanded to include six 
domains of neighboring Echigo Province, led by the Nagaoka-han 長岡藩.73 Kawai Tsugunosuke, 
chief elder and de facto ruler of Nagaoka, had tried to personally negotiate peace and the 
noninterference of the imperial troops vis-à-vis his domain. Unfortunately for him, he was 
rebuffed by an inexperienced imperial army negotiator who was criticized for years by his Sat-
chō colleagues.74 
The final draft of the Alliance’s treaty document, as signed by all 31 of the domains who 
would join it, read as follows.75 
The domains of Mutsu[,] Dewa, [and Echigo], presently gathered 
in council at Sendai, communicate the following to the 
government-general for pacification. Having cultivated this 
covenant, we desire to follow the path of fairness and justice, to 
engage in unanimous cooperation, to revere the imperial court 
above and comfort the people below, and by preserving the 
imperial land, to set His Majesty's heart at ease. Therefore our 
rules are as follows. 
ITEM: Extending great justice to all the country as our goal, we 
shall avoid trivialities. 
ITEM: As though traveling across the sea in the same boat, we will 
be with trust and move with justice. 
ITEM: If there is a case of emergency, neighboring domains are to 
promptly provide assistance and notify the government-general. 
ITEM: Let none rely on brute strength or bully the weak. Let there 
not be plans for private gain. Let there not be leaking of secret 
matters. Let there be no one who leaves the Alliance. 
ITEM: Though fortifications are built and provisions transported, 
even though it is inconvenient, the peasants are not to be made 
to toil and suffer pointlessly. 
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ITEM: Major incidents shall be decided with the deliberation of 
the entire Alliance, with intent to return to a principle of fairness. 
By virtue of the agreement being solid, the details will naturally 
fall into place. 
ITEM: Plans with other provinces or troop deployments to 
neighboring borders, must be done with notification to the entire 
Alliance. 
ITEM: Let there not be slaughtering of innocents. Let there not be 
plundering of money and grain. Those who follow the path of 
injustice shall be met with severe punishment. 
In the case that these rules are disregarded, let the Alliance, 
gathered in council, visit severe punishment [on the offender]. 
 
This alliance, comprised at its peak of thirty-one large and small domains (excluding Aizu 
and Shōnai but working together with them), used a combination of old and new weapons,76 
and its members fought against what they perceived as Sat-chō dominance of the imperial 
court. They were not opposed to the emperor's rule, neither were they supporters of the 
former shogun, though they did take advantage of the ex-Tokugawa troops who had come into 
their territory, since they shared a common enemy.77 Eventually the alliance had its own 
sovereign, the Emperor Tōbu 東武天皇 (1847-1895; later known as Prince Kitashirakawa-no-
miya Yoshihisa), and called its troops the True Imperial Army (Shin-kangun 真官軍 ), 
developments which were even covered by The New York Times.78 They said they sought to 
defeat the Sat-chō control of the imperial court, so that the emperor "may indeed reign over 
it."79 
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The following is a table of the Alliance’s members. This should offer some idea of the 
diversity of its member domains, in terms of size and classification.80 With several domains that 
had incomes over 100,000 koku, the combined incomes of the Alliance amounted to over 
2,500,000 koku; against this, the domains that formed the backbone of the Meiji government’s 
army had a combined income level of 1,200,000 koku.81 Some ruling families’ names appear 
twice in this list; these are branch families of larger domainal lords, and should be understood 
as following whatever the course of action that the main family would choose to follow. 
Table I.1: Members of the Alliance 
Domain Ruling family Income level Status 
Sendai Date 625,000 koku Tozama 
Yonezawa Uesugi 150,000 koku Tozama 
Yonezawa-Shinden Uesugi 10,000 koku Tozama 
Morioka Nanbu 200,000 koku Tozama 
Akita Satake 205,800 koku Tozama 
Hirosaki Tsugaru 100,000 koku Tozama 
Nihonmatsu Niwa 100,000 koku Tozama 
Moriyama Matsudaira 20,000 koku Shinpan 
Shinjō Tozawa 68,200 koku Tozama 
Hachinohe Nanbu 20,000 koku Tozama 
Tanagura Abe 100,000 koku Fudai 
Nakamura Sōma 60,000 koku Tozama 
Miharu Akita 50,000 koku Tozama 
Yamagata Mizuno 50,000 koku Fudai 
Iwakidaira Andō 67,000 koku Fudai 
Matsumae Matsumae 10,000 koku Tozama 
Fukushima Itakura 30,000 koku Fudai 
Honjō Rokugō 20,000 koku Tozama 
Izumi Honda 20,000 koku Fudai 
Kameda Iwaki 20,000 koku Tozama 
Yunagaya Naitō 15,000 koku Tozama 
Shimotedo Tachibana 10,000 koku Tozama 
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Yajima Ikoma 8,000 koku Tozama 
Ichinoseki Tamura 30,000 koku Tozama 
Kaminoyama Matsudaira82 40,000 koku Fudai 
Tendō Oda83 20,000 koku Tozama 
Shibata Mizoguchi 50,000 koku Tozama 
Muramatsu Hori 30,000 koku Tozama 
Mineyama Makino 11,000 koku Fudai 
Nagaoka Makino 110,000 koku Fudai 
Kurokawa Yanagisawa 10,000 koku Fudai 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Few Key Figures 
 
 Any discussion of the Alliance would be incomplete without a discussion of some of its 
key figures. Below are a few brief biographical sketches. 
 As said above, the Alliance was headed by Prince Rinnōji-no-miya Kōgen. The prince, 
born in Kyoto in 1847, was the ninth child of Prince Fushimi-no-miya Kuniie.84 He entered the 
priesthood at a young age and served as the last abbot of Kan’ei-ji, a Tokugawa-affiliated 
temple in Edo.85 After the takeover of Edo by the imperial forces he fled to the north, and 
became the northern emperor; he relinquished this title upon Sendai-   ’s surrender. A few 
years later the prince was pardoned. He later joined the Imperial Japanese Army, and as Prince 
Kitashirakawa Yoshihisa, he led the Japanese expeditionary forces that conquered Taiwan. He 
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died of malaria in Taiwan, and was enshrined in the Shintō shrines that existed on the island 
until the end of World War II.86 
 Date Yoshikuni, the daimyo of Sendai, was one of the two governors-general (Sōtoku 総
督) of the Alliance. Unlike most of his daimyo peers, he was the son of one of his father’s 
concubines and therefore actually born in the domain he went on to rule. It bears noting that 
among the ranks of Yoshikuni’s myriad retainers was one Takahashi Korekiyo, then a young foot 
soldier sent to study abroad in San Francisco.87 After the war, Yoshikuni would meet the young 
Takahashi, who went on to become Prime Minister of Japan and who, as “Japan’s Keynes,” 
would bring Japan out of the Great Depression sooner than Western nations.88 Uesugi Narinori, 
the other governor-general, was daimyo of Yonezawa.89 Both Date and Uesugi were highly 
active in negotiation and communication from the very start of the war, and accounts of the 
Alliance’s actions are filled with their petitions, trips, and meetings with other daimyo, senior 
officers from various domains, and the representatives of the imperial government.90 
 Tamamushi Sadayu was, by far, the most cosmopolitan among the Alliance’s key figures. 
He was born in Sendai in 1823, the son of a Sendai domain retainer who served the lord as a 
falconer.91 He was part of the shogunate’s 1860 mission to the United States, and kept a 
lengthy journal of his travels. During the Alliance’s brief history, he was closely involved in the 
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negotiations that surrounded its formation, and he remained an instrumental figure in its 
operations. After the surrender, and by order of the Meiji government, Tamamushi was made 
to commit suicide in the spring of 1869.92 
 Tadaki Tosa, one of the clan elders in whose name the initial invitation was sent, also 
bears recognition here. He was the head of one of three families who held the hereditary post 
of magistrate (bugyō 奉行), analogous to the clan elders (karō 家老) of other domains. In other 
words, he was one of three men entrusted the day-to-day running of Sendai-han affairs in 
peace and continued to do so during this war. When the Alliance fell, he was one of the many 
senior retainers in domains across northern Japan who committed seppuku.93 
 The final figure I would like to present is Kawai Tsugunosuke 河井継之助. Kawai, born in 
1827, was clan elder of Nagaoka-han, a relatively small domain in Echigo Province.94 It was by 
Kawai’s leadership that six domains of northern Echigo entered the alliance, expanding it 
beyond the borders of Mutsu and Dewa Provinces. The troops under Kawai’s command 
represented some of the most technologically advanced in the entire Alliance, having even a 
pair of Gatling guns and other advanced weaponry at their disposal.95 After losing, retaking, and 
then losing Nagaoka Castle, Kawai retreated to Aizu territory, fatally wounded and suffering 
from gangrene. Despite the aid of Matsumoto Ryojun, one of the foremost Japanese physicians 
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of his era, Kawai’s wound was mortal.96 He died on 8/16 in Aizu territory, just before the siege 
began there.97 
Battles and Fall of the Alliance 
As the weeks of 1868 wore on, the alliance's troops fought pitched battles, first against 
the imperial troops on its southern border,98 then against those of its member domains which 
had switched sides. Chief among these deserters was the domain of Akita. Akita, a mid-sized 
domain of a little over 200,000 koku, joined the imperial forces in late summer. Almost 
immediately it found itself surrounded by its now hostile former allies. Akita was followed by 
the Hirosaki domain, which was half of Akita’s size and immediately bordering it to the north.99 
Not surprisingly, after the war both domains fared very well in the eyes of the imperial 
government, while nearly all their neighbors were to suffer loss of land or prestige in some way. 
Though some Sendai troops acquired a bad reputation for breaking in heavy combat 
(earning them the derisive nickname dongori),100 the Alliance as a whole had a good amount of 
success in combat. Particularly noteworthy is the action of Sendai guerilla troops on the 
southern front,101 and the action of Sendai-han, Ichinoseki-han 一関藩, and Morioka-han 盛岡
                                                          
96
 Yamakawa Kenjirō 山川健次郎, Aizu Boshin Senshi 会津戊辰戦史 (Tōkyō 東京: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai 東
京大学出版会, 1933), p. 441. 
97
 Ibid, p. 441. 
98
 Including multiple engagements at the strategic castletown of Shirakawa 白河. Nihon no Kassen 8, p. 157; 
Nakamura, Byakkotai, p. 54; Itō Tetsuya 伊藤哲也, “Saitō Hajime nenpu” 斉藤一年譜 in S           S   ō 
Hajime no subete 新撰組斉藤一のすべて, pp. 223-243. (Tōkyō 東京: Shin Jinbutsu Ōraisha 新人物往来社, 
2003), p. 235. 
99
 Edwin McClellan, Woman in the Crested Kimono. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), p. 12. 
100
 Dongori being an onomatopoeia: every time the cannons went don, the Sendai samurai would run five ri 
(around 12 miles). Hoshi Ryōichi, Sendai Boshin Senshi: Hoppō Seiken wo Mezashita Y shatachi 仙台戊辰戦史 : 
北方政権を目ざした勇者たち. (Tōkyō 東京: Sanshūsha 三修社, 2005), p. 163. 
101
 Yanagi Toshiyuki 柳敏之, K kō Ō  S   ō 紀行奥羽戦争. (Tōkyō 東京: Bungeisha 文芸社, 2000), p. 17. One such 
unit in particular, composed of gangsters and hunters and led by low-ranking Sendai samurai Hosoya Jūdayū 細
谷十太夫 (1839-1907), was especially feared. They dressed in dark blue, attacked by night, and were based in a 
brothel called Kashiwa-ya 柏屋. 
23 
藩 troops in the northern front, against the Akita domain.102 Shōnai-han, technically not a 
member, also assisted in the Alliance’s efforts, enjoying a string of crushing victories in its own 
campaign on the Sea of Japan coast. Shōnai troops overran the domains of Shinjō,103 Honjō,104 
Kameda,105 and Yajima,106 and were in possession of two thirds of Akita territory by the end of 
the war and coming close to the Akita castle town.107 But with so much of the Alliance’s military 
power focused northward in trying to bring Akita and Hirosaki in line, it was less and less able to 
deal with the imperial troops coming up from the south. With several of its members leaving, 
and the lightning strike of Itagaki Taisuke 板垣退助 (1837-1919) taking several small yet 
strategically positioned domains out of the equation,108 it was unable to remain cohesive. The 
Aizu domain, the reason for so much of this conflict, surrendered on 9/22 after a month-long 
siege.109 Shōnai, despite having nearly incapacitated the Akita domain, surrendered on 9/25.110 
Finally, with the surrender of Yonezawa on 8/28,111 and Sendai on 9/15/Meiji 1, the Alliance 
itself ceased to exist.112 
The Alliance had passed into the pages of history, but the Boshin War itself had not 
ended. The fighting went on for several more months, with the theater of action moving 
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northward to the island of Hokkaidō 北海道 (then known as Ezo 蝦夷). Ex-shogunal land and 
naval forces under Enomoto Takeaki 榎本武揚 (1836-1908), having stopped on the coast of 
Sendai-han territory to pick up anyone there who wished to continue fighting, 113 arrived in 
Hokkaido on 10/20,114 and took the city of Hakodate on 10/26.115 Enomoto’s forces quickly 
subdued the island and formed a new government of their own, known as the Ezo Republic (Ezo 
Kyōwakoku 蝦夷共和国), with Enomoto elected as president. 
The forces of the Meiji government were delayed by the winter, but in the spring, 
renewed their offensive, landing troops on the island on 4/9 at Otobe. 116 In the face of 
overwhelming opposition and the loss of several of its warships, the Ezo Republic was unable to 
continue effective opposition. Matsumae fell on 4/17, 117 and by 5/11 the Meiji government 
troops were in Hakodate and had started an all-out offensive and barrage on Goryōkaku 五稜
郭, the huge western-style fortress at the center of the city. 118 On 5/15 Bentendaiba 弁天台場, 
the last outlying Ezo Republic fortress, was surrendered by its commander, Nagai Naomune 永
井尚志 (1816-1891).119 The war ended a week later on 5/18/Meiji 2,120 with the surrender of 
Enomoto and his staff at Goryōkaku.121 Thus, at the price of blood and internecine war, Japan 
passed from the early modern era into the modern era. 
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CHAPTER III: The Victors’ Narrative and Some of its Key Terms 
 Many different people can be characterized as having written about the Boshin War 
from the victors’ point of view. They came from a variety of origins: some from the three big 
han that led the fight (Satsuma, Choshu, and Tosa), others came from domains who later joined 
that coalition, still others were unaffiliated with any particular domain and were simply 
espousing the predominant viewpoint of their era. However, there are enough key points of 
commonality that one can form something of a summarized view of their perspective. After a 
lengthy struggle by pro-emperor (kinnō 勤皇) activists in the 1860s, a loose alliance of southern 
clans and their aristocratic supporters at the imperial court seized control of the court and the 
young emperor Mutsuhito in order to restore the power of the emperor that had long been 
usurped by the Tokugawa shogunate. The shogun had resigned, yes, but he refused to 
surrender all his lands and titles. At the beginning of the new year, the ex-shogun’s 
disobedience turned to treachery as he sent his horde of warmongering Aizu and Kuwana 
troops122 to forcibly retake control of the court. But on the second day of the battle the imperial 
banners were raised and Yoshinobu and his supporters now formally became enemies of the 
throne (chōteki 朝敵) and an army of brigands (zokugun 賊軍). The armies of the southern 
alliance, by contrast, demonstrated their loyalty and the banners designated them as the 
imperial army (kangun 官軍). Emissaries were sent all around Japan to demand obedience to 
the imperial court and urge armed suppression of Yoshinobu’s supporters, but some clans in 
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the northeast sided with Aizu in a pro-shogunate (sabaku 佐幕) alliance.123 After their defeat, 
the Tokugawa separatists in Hokkaido held out, but they too were crushed in short order, and 
the new era of enlightenment and civilization (bunmei kaika 文明開化) could now begin. 
 What are the key terms in the victors’ narrative? The first is kinnō. This is a term that 
should be very familiar to scholars of the 1860s. It was used by all sorts of people to describe 
and justify a wide range of activities, but very often refers (in the context of the 1860s) to 
adherents of sonnō-jōi ideology. The next term is chōteki. This is an abbreviation, with chō 
being short for chōtei, or the imperial court. This was a truly horrifying state of affairs for those 
to whom the label was applied. In the case of Aizu, as Takie Sugiyama Lebra says, the label of 
chōteki “agonized Aizuites more than their defeat.”124 Zokugun, “brigand army,” is a term that 
implies chōteki status. However, it uses the phrase “zoku,” which can be used for any robber or 
thief. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is the term sabaku, incorporating the 
characters for “help” and the first character in bakufu (shogunate). We will turn to this term in 
the section below.  
 This sort of language was already readily apparent in primary materials from the war 
itself. Even if it did not use these specific terms, it used other terms with similar connotation. 
Take, for example, this edict, issued by the imperial government on 1/17 to the Sendai 
domain:125 
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On this occasion Aizu [lord, Matsudaira] Katamori has assisted in 
the treachery of Tokugawa Yoshinobu and fired on the imperial 
banners, thereby committing wickedness and high treason! As an 
army of subjugation is necessary, and your domain has requested 
to singlehandedly attack his main castle, we are pleased by this 
speedy result that has come without any loss of your martial 
exertion. Therefore you are ordered to proceed per your wishes, 
and to quickly earn the distinction of striking him in pursuit. 
 
The language clearly delineates ex-shogun Yoshinobu, and Aizu lord Matsudaira 
Katamori, as criminals of the highest order. Matsudaira Katamori, the document would have us 
believe, has gone beyond “mere” treason to high treason (daigyaku 大逆) and wickedness 
(mudō 無道). As he is guilty of such horrific crimes, therefore, it behooves the lord of Sendai to 
take the initiative and lead an army of subjugation (seibatsugun 征伐軍) to crush the forces of 
such a wicked man as soon as possible. Another order from the court, this one dated 4/17 and 
addressed directly to Date Yoshikuni himself, shows more of this language at play.126 
DATE MUTSU-NO-KAMI: 
You have been previously ordered on this occasion to pursue the 
Aizu brigands and wipe them out, but the news of your victory 
has yet to emerge; the Emperor’s mind is troubled *at this+. 
 
The operative term here is “Aizu brigands” (Kaizoku 会賊). The zoku is the same zoku as 
in zokugun, here abbreviated and specifically referring to the people of Aizu. 
But what of material written after the war? A good example of an “orthodox” text on 
the Boshin War and the Northern Alliance is Akita-han B      K   ō S       秋田藩戊辰勤皇
始末.127 This text, written in Akita Prefecture, was created to praise and justify the conduct of 
Akita-han, one of the northeastern domains which made the imperial victory possible by 
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leaving the Alliance. Even in the title this is apparent: it translates to “An Explanation of Akita-
han’s Imperial Loyalty in the *Year of+ Boshin.” The key term in the title is k   ō, “imperial 
loyalty.” In the text itself, the forces of and allied to the Meiji government are termed as the 
“imperial army” (kangun 官軍). Those who fought against the Satsuma and Chōshū-dominated 
imperial army are therefore termed the “traitor army” (zokugun 賊軍) or “pro-Shogunate 
faction” (sabaku-ha 佐幕派). The assassination of Sendai-han messengers,128 which was the 
action by which Akita left the Alliance, is termed as “punitive execution” (ch riku 誅戮), a term 
that connotes the execution of a criminal or traitor.129 The imperial court and those claiming to 
work in its name were “good,” anyone fighting against it for any reason was not only “bad,” but 
also a remnant of the old order. Therefore, fighting the “bad” side was not only just, it was 
punishment for treason. 
In short, “good” side and “bad” side in the orthodox Meiji view of the Boshin War hinges 
upon one’s relation—as parsed by the men who controlled him— to the emperor. The people 
who fight under the emperor’s banner are kinno, and anyone who opposes them is not only an 
enemy of the throne, but a brigand, to boot. Furthermore, because they are opponents of the 
emperor’s soldiers, they automatically fall into the category of “pro-shogunate,” whether they 
had anything to do with the now defunct shogunate or not. 
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This pro/anti emperor dichotomy is but one part of the deliberately emperor-centered 
order that was Japan in the Meiji era.130 The emperor was, of course, present in the preceding 
eras and was, among other things, an important part of the legitimacy claimed by the shogun. 
However, in the Meiji era, to quote the historians Jansen and Rozman, “the sovereign became 
the cornerstone of every institution.”131 The defeat of those who resisted the imperial army 
was termed in the language of foreign conquest, making the vanquished somehow less than 
Japanese.132 Yasukuni, the new shrine built in Tōkyō at the end of the war, to house the war 
dead, also deliberately excluded “enemies of the throne.” 133 But in the eyes of those who had 
been defeated, including people who had fought as part of the Alliance, loyalty to the emperor 
and support of the imperial court had never been in question. 
Years down the road, when the youth of 1868 had grown old, Hara Takashi 原敬 (1856-
1921), a Morioka-han samurai who later became prime minister, gave a speech at a temple in 
Morioka. The speech is, in my opinion, a good summary of the feelings of those who survived 
defeat in 1868: 
When we look back, how could any Japanese subject of olden 
days, any more than now, draw his bow against the emperor? The 
Restoration was simply a conflict of political views. At the time, 
there was a popular song, “Winners—the imperial army; losers—
rebels.” That accurately describes the situation in 1868. But now 
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all subjects share in the radiance of the emperor’s gracious favor, 
as is clear to all. So be at rest!134 
 
 Having summarized the victors’ view on the Boshin War, let us now turn to a 
deconstruction of that view. 
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CHAPTER IV: Deconstructing the Victors’ Narrative: The Question of Sabaku 
In my opinion that the most important question to ask, in response to the victors’ choice 
of words, is this: were the domains of the alliance sabaku, i.e. pro-shogun? As we will see later 
in the section on western historiography, one of the tendencies among scholars is to place in 
one group everyone who fought against the Meiji government. Perhaps because the last to 
surrender in the Boshin War were Tokugawa vassals, everyone who fought against the Meiji 
government is frequently grouped together in this category. The other labels attached to the 
enemies of the Meiji government (e.g. zokugun, chōteki) are ultimately subjective. However, In 
my opinion sabaku is the one label from among them that could, given the right facts, be 
construed as an objective label for the alliance. Given the facts, though, the answer is a 
resounding no. 
My first reason is that by the time the Alliance came into existence, the bakufu was 
dead. The last shogun resigned in late 1867;135 by the time the Alliance was formed, the city of 
Edo was surrendered to the imperial army136 and the ex-shogun had gone into confinement in 
Mito. 137 The armies of the ex-shogun fought on, but they were operating against the official 
policy of surrender and cooperation taken by the people chosen to represent the Tokugawa 
family.138 The vestiges of the bakufu’s administrative apparatus were gone. If the bakufu was 
dead, and the Tokugawa family’s official representatives were dedicated to keeping it dead, 
how could anyone support it? It seems that speaking of the Alliance’s political stance as sabaku, 
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or describing the actions of the imperial army as tobaku, is more geared toward killing the idea 
of the bakufu, since the bakufu itself was dead. 
My second reason for opposing the idea of the alliance as pro-Tokugawa is the issue of 
the Alliance’s composition. As seen in the table above, at its height, the Alliance was comprised 
of 20 tozama domains, nine fudai domains, and one shinpan domain. The majority of the 
Alliance’s domains were tozama. Tozama were outsiders in the Tokugawa order, domains 
whose lords had only pledged fealty to Tokugawa Ieyasu after the Battle of Sekigahara.139 In 
this category were the Alliance’s leading domains of Sendai and Yonezawa, but the category 
also included the Satsuma and Chōshū domains, who were busy denouncing Sendai and 
Yonezawa as “pro-Tokugawa.” While it is true that all tozama including Satsuma and Chōshū 
received perks (the big ones received the honorary Matsudaira surname, as well as marriage 
ties to the shogunal house and its collaterals),140 they were forcibly excluded from the 
Tokugawa regime. What possible interest could any of them have in bringing back an order that 
left them disenfranchised? Out of seven major (100,000 koku and above) domains in the 
Alliance, five were ruled by tozama daimyo. Sendai, in Mutsu Province, was the largest domain 
of the region, and the third largest domain in the country (after Kaga141 and Satsuma142). Its 
ruling family, the Date, had been a major power in the region for well over three centuries. 
Yonezawa, in Dewa Province, was ruled by the Uesugi family.143 They were another old rival of 
the Tokugawa—the Edo period had begun with the Date, as allies of the Tokugawa, besieging 
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the Uesugi clan’s castle.144 Akita, also in Dewa, was ruled by the Satake family. The Satake were 
forcibly relocated there by the Tokugawa in the 17th century, so there was no love lost between 
the two. The 200,000 koku Morioka domain was ruled by the Nanbu clan.145 The Nanbu lord too 
was considered a tozama. Finally, there was the Hirosaki domain on the far northern tip of 
Honshu, ruled by the Tsugaru family. The Tsugaru were also tozama, and had close family ties 
with the courtly Konoe family.146 If the majority of the Alliance was composed of big and 
midsized tozama, why did the fudai join? As Harold Bolitho says in his book on the fudai, 
though nominally Tokugawa vassals, they were ultimately lords in their own right who were 
motivated by self-interest.147 There were a fair number of fudai lords, after all, who had joined 
the imperial army (including the highest ranking fudai, Ii Naonori of Hikone-han148). As Sendai, 
the biggest power in the region, had chosen to be at the core of a competing attempt at a new 
government, they sided with Sendai. In the entire war, out of all the fudai lords in Japan, there 
was only one who took up arms on behalf of the Tokugawa family. This was the 21 year old 
Hayashi Tadataka 林忠崇 (1846-1941), ruler of the tiny Jōzai-han 請西藩.149 He was present in 
northeastern Japan during the Alliance’s existence, and fought alongside its troops, as they 
shared a common enemy. He laid down his arms when he learned that the Tokugawa family’s 
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future was secure due to the succession of Tokugawa Iesato as the new family head,150 as well 
as the creation of a new domain for the family in the form of Shizuoka-han 静岡藩.151 It bears 
noting, however, that Hayashi’s domain was not in northeastern Japan, it was in the Bosō 
Peninsula. 
My third reason for opposing the notion of the alliance being sabaku is the person of 
Prince Rinnōji-no-miya Kōgen (later known as Prince Kitashirakawa-no-miya Yoshihisa). The 
prince, who had been abbot of the Kan’ei-ji temple in Edo, fled to the north and as stated above, 
installed himself as emperor, taking the name Emperor Tōbu. This was not all: a document 
exists which shows us that the daimyo who had joined the alliance received positions in a new 
imperial court centered around Emperor Tobu. Date Yoshikuni of Sendai even received the title 
of shogun in this document, with Matsudaira Katamori of Aizu as his vice-shogun. 152 These 
would not seem to be the actions of people who were eager to once again place themselves 
under the subjection of a Tokugawa shogun. They are, rather, the actions of people who had 
created their own alternative version of the new world order. 
My final reason for opposing the notion of the alliance being sabaku is its set of stated 
goals, and its actions toward modernization and industrialization. These goals were as 
follows:153 
1. Stopping the imperial army’s entry to Shirakawa Castle. 
2. Sendai-han to set up Shirakawa Castle as a command post from whence to direct the 
activities of the nearby domains. 
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3. Aizu troops to advance on Nikkō from Takahara, together with ex-shogunate forces in 
the area. 
4. After expelling the imperial army from Utsunomiya, Alliance is to bring in the 
domains of Shimotsuke and Hitachi, and for a time, treat the Tone River as its 
boundary. Strengthening its defenses, it will extend its control to the Bōsō Peninsula. 
As Edo is easy to take but well-defended, plans for its takeover will be decided later. 
5. Reach is to be extended to Shinano, Kōzuke, and Kai, and advances to be made with 
the help of domains in the Kantō. 
6. The southerners’ force strength is to be reduced by making an alliance with Kaga and 
Kii a reality. 
 
These goals show a robust strategy that was looking to bring in others from outside the 
region. Bringing in Kaga, the largest tozama domain in Japan (and by extension, its three branch 
domains of Nanokaichi, Daishoji, and Toyama154) at over 1,000,000 koku, was no small matter. 
The goals aim for the use of ex-shogunate forces, but even so, In my opinion this may best be 
characterized as an alliance of convenience rather than a meeting point of ideology. The 
alliance’s and the ex-shogunate troops’ views on the future may have differed but their enemy 
was the same. One is left to wonder what the ex-shogunate forces would have done, had the 
alliance been successful in its aims and managed to realize its advance southward. Might they 
have been a thorn in the side of an Alliance-led imperial government? In the realm of 
technology, while the Alliance was unable to field all-modern technology, its members were 
taking their own steps toward that goal. The troops of Nagaoka-han, for instance, were 
equipped with breech-loading rifles and two Gatling guns.155 In addition to its acquisition of 
Enfield rifles and modernization of military structure,156 Sendai-han also possessed a modern 
                                                          
154
 Edo Bakuhan Daimyōke Jiten Vol. 2, p. 397. 
155
 Naramoto, p. 414. 
156
 Yamada, p. 219. 
36 
steam-driven warship.157 Given these and other actions, it is fair to assume that the Alliance 
would have continued and intensified that trend, had it been able. 
Even if their actions had not been in support of the ex-shogun, the survivors from 
among the ranks of the vanquished were to a point persona non grata in the new Japan. 
Because of the importance of the emperor in the new Japan, setting the record straight, in their 
eyes, was vital. It was not only a matter of trying to achieve fairness, but also a matter of 
justifying their place in the new order, and proving that they too were just as Japanese as 
everyone else. How did they do this? We will see below. 
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CHAPTER V: The Victors’ Narrative Challenged, the Current State of that Challenge 
Though they were vanquished, the people of northeastern Japan did not stay silent. 
Some among them, particularly among the former samurai population, published their views as 
the years went on, and challenged the victors’ narrative. What did they say, and how did they 
challenge the victors’ narrative and its language? 
A good example of one such author is Yamakawa Kenjirō 山川健次郎 (1854-1931). 
Yamakawa, famed for being the first Japanese professor of physics,158 was a combat veteran of 
the Boshin War, an ex-Aizu samurai159 and a survivor of the siege at Aizu in fall 1868.160 Later in 
life, in addition to his academic duties as a professor and then as a university president, he was 
also an historian. His preeminent history text is Aizu Boshin Senshi 会津戊辰戦史, which is an 
account of the Aizu domain and its actions in the Boshin War, up to its surrender in the late 
autumn of 1868. Though he was, doubtlessly, motivated by a desire to tell a vanquished 
fiefdom’s side of the story, he chose words that would sidestep the issue of loyalty to the 
emperor. Yamakawa refers to the imperial army as the western army (seigun 西軍), and to 
those who opposed them, variously, by what they actually were. So the ex-shogun’s army is 
“the former shogunate army” (ky  bakugun 旧幕軍), Aizu troops are “the Aizu army” (Aizu-gun
会津軍), and the Alliance forces are “the alliance army” (dōmeigun 同盟軍). By avoiding the 
labeling of who constitutes “imperial army” and who does not, he removes the issue of imperial 
loyalty from the discussion. 
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Another example, quoted above, is that of Prime Minister Hara. As stated, Hara was a 
native of Morioka, born into a high-ranking family of retainers in the service of the Nanbu lord. 
In the late Meiji and early Taisho eras, Hara served in the imperial government (as prime 
minister 1918-1921). He used this position to bring about a change in at least some of the 
language used by the imperial government with regards to the Boshin War. Part of a diary entry 
by Hara161 during his tenure as home minister and chief commissioner for the enthronement 
ceremony of the soon-to-be Emperor Taisho, bears quoting in full: 
Afternoon. When I attended the commissioners’ conference and 
we discussed a number of matters, I was annoyed to see that 
certain banners to be displayed at the enthronement ceremony 
bore titles such as ‘Used in the suppression of the northeast at the 
time of the Restoration,’ or ‘Designed after an imperial standard 
entrusted to the commander-in-chief during the subjugation of 
Ou province.’ It was agreed that today, when we are all grateful 
subjects of the emperor, expressions usually used to describe 
foreign conquest were improper, and I had them removed. 
 
 The shades of the victors’ language, mentioned above, is clearly evident in the labels 
accompanying the objects that Hara saw. But having climbed to a political position with clout, 
he had the power and the prerogative to have these objects removed, and that is just what he 
did. 
Aside from Yamakawa and Hara, other such individuals from defeated territories in 
northeastern Japan include Shiba Gorō, Kitahara Masanaga, 162  Fujiwara Ainosuke, 163  and 
Yamakawa’s brother Yamakawa Hiroshi. All of them wrote about the war; some, like Shiba Gorō, 
wrote about their lives before the war. Many of the key Japanese authors in modern 
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scholarship on the Boshin War are descendants of people from northeastern Japan: Hoshi 
Ryōichi, Yamada Norio, and Kobiyama Rokurō are three key examples. As time marched on, 
more and more of the survivors either sat for interviews or put their own words to paper, with 
the result that there is a wealth of eyewitness material available to modern scholars. 
What is the present-day result of these voices who spoke out against the status quo of 
historical interpretation? Some sources still make use of terms like “pro-shogun” to describe 
the Northern Alliance and anyone else who fought against the Meiji government. However, on 
the whole, there is a great deal of nuanced discussion on the Boshin War in general and on the 
Alliance in particular. 
There are many Japanese books in print which mention the Alliance, and give at least 
some coverage to the stories of those among the ranks of the defeated parties in the Boshin 
War. Particularly noteworthy is Boshin no Eki Senshi, a massive two-volume work by Ōyama 
Kashiwa numbering well over 1800 pages in total, which took over twenty years to complete.164 
It covers almost every single military action of the war in detail, and includes maps, orders of 
battle, and photographs of key figures. Ōyama even discusses the rewards and punishments 
meted out by the central government that followed the war.165 While Ōyama’s views are 
understandably skewed given that his father was none other than Field Marshal Ōyama Iwao, 
he devotes a great deal of time and space to analyzing the war, battle by battle, from both sides. 
Being a trained officer of the old Imperial Japanese Army, he was more than equipped, in terms 
of training, to look at these battles through the perspective of modern military science. 
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More recently, there has been a wave of books focusing on the history of northeastern 
Japan in the Meiji Restoration. Some are whole domainal histories, like Noguchi Shin’ichi’s Aizu-
han which I have used in this thesis. Others focus on the actions of individual domains in the 
Boshin War, as with Hoshi Ryōichi’s Sendai Boshin Senshi. As far as scholarly attention given to 
the Alliance, Sendai-born authors Onodera Eikō and Hoshi Ryōichi have authored works entirely 
devoted to its history, and offer interesting insights into the complexities of its short, turbulent 
existence. Indeed, this thesis is possible, in part, because of both men’s efforts in producing 
modern writing on the Alliance. Finally, there also exist a number of works concerning the 
senior commanders active in the Northern Alliance, such as Ōta Toshiho’s Narayama Sado no 
Subete.166 
As seen above, the landscape of Japanese discourse on the Meiji Restoration is broader 
than it once was. Thanks in no small part to the efforts of the survivors from among the 
vanquished clans, the official line is still repeated but is no longer uncontested. 
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CHAPTER VI: Conclusion 
The Boshin War was a catastrophe. It pitted Japanese against their fellow Japanese, all 
ostensibly in the name of a man whom most of them had never seen before and whom some 
had never even heard of before: the emperor.167 Because the ideology of the new order was so 
centered on the emperor, the historical narrative was no exception. Historical writing by the 
victors centered on the emperor and their privileged connection to him, as opposed to the 
other side in the war, who they felt had betrayed the emperor. So the Northern Alliance, 
despite its intentions, its composition, and even its own emperor, was characterized as anti-
Imperial or pro-shogun. However, when one looks into the primary sources, one finds that this 
was anything but the case. As Prime Minister Hara said, the Boshin War was a difference of 
political opinion, and had nothing to do with loyalty or disloyalty to the emperor. In time, 
Japanese voices arose which challenged the victors’ viewpoint. Through their work, they 
showed that another way, using words not as politically charged, was possible in discussions of 
the war. This resulted, in the present day, in a rich plurality of viewpoints on the war. The 
discourse on the war is no longer locked up in the language of the winners. 
While a few western historians have chosen the latter path, the preponderance still 
tends to follow the language of the victors. This is understandable, given that the war, not to 
mention the Alliance, is a mere footnote or chapter in works on other topics or individuals, and 
it is easier to take a reductionist approach for the sake of moving the discussion along. However, 
I think that as the war appears in so much of western scholarship on the era, it deserves a 
focused study of its own. In the meantime, I believe that the western historical establishment 
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should take this point of deficiency as a challenge to do as Japanese scholars have done. It 
should look deeper into the history of the Meiji Restoration, and continue to seek out new 
perspectives, new narratives, and new texts in an effort to deepen and broaden the discourse 
on this pivotal episode in Japanese history. 
As stated in my introduction, the Northern Alliance existed for what amounts to an 
eyeblink on the stage of history. From foundation to collapse, it did not even last for a whole 
year. Furthermore, it was only one of a set of competing visions for the future of Japan. But 
when one realizes this, and that its stance was not in support of the old order, a new picture of 
the Boshin War and the Meiji Restoration begins to emerge. It shows us that the war was not a 
mere footnote in the tale of unopposed progress to a new, modern Japan. It also suggests to us 
that perhaps there was not only one choice and one path for Japan’s advance into the modern 
age.  
In closing, I feel it is fitting to quote the writing of Hanamure Tsutomu. Hanamure, a 
descendant of a Satsuma samurai who fought in the northeast, edited his ancestor’s combat 
diary from the Boshin War, and penned a concise introduction to that work. Both Hanamure 
men take a remarkably open-minded approach in their writing on the war, and show 
remarkable magnanimity for people who have more in common with the men of the Meiji 
government than the men of the Northern Alliance. For better or worse, It sums up the 
importance of acknowledging the stories, and the humanity, of those who were vanquished. 
"Over 130 years have passed since the Boshin War, Japan's first 
revolutionary conflict that engulfed its entire territory. Many great men 
starting with Saigō Takamori were made by way of the Meiji Restoration 
that arose through the opportunity of this war. However, the war was 
fought, on both the (new) government and shogunal sides, and suffered 
through wounding or death, by the individual soldiers who were lower 
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samurai, country samurai, and commoners. We must never forget that 
the Meiji Restoration, and the founding of modern Japan, was founded 
on the sacrifice of this nameless multitude."168  
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Appendix A: The Articles of Alliance 
 
First Draft169 
The domains of Mutsu and Dewa, presently gathered in council at Sendai, communicate 
the following to the government-general for pacification. Having cultivated this covenant, we 
desire to follow the path of fairness and justice, to engage in unanimous cooperation, to revere 
the imperial court above and comfort the people below, and by preserving the imperial land, to 
set His Majesty's heart at ease. Therefore our rules are as follows. 
ITEM: The allied domains shall visit punishment on those who rely on [brute] strength, 
pressure the weak, and take advantage of emergencies.  
ITEM: Let those who plan for private gain, leak secret matters, or leave the Alliance be 
visited with punishment. 
ITEM: Let those who needlessly exhaust men and horses, and do not consider the plight 
of the common people, be visited with punishment. 
ITEM: Major matters shall be decided with all the domains in council, but in cases of 
military matters, detailed deliberations are unnecessary, and the orders of the larger domains 
are to be followed. 
ITEM: Let those who slaughter innocents, plunder money and grain, and do other things 
which violate just cause, be swiftly be given severe punishment. 
 
Second Draft170 
The domains of Mutsu and Dewa, presently gathered in council at Sendai, communicate 
the following to the government-general for pacification. Having cultivated this covenant, we 
desire to follow the path of fairness and justice, to engage in unanimous cooperation, to revere 
the imperial court above and comfort the people below, and by preserving the imperial land, to 
set His Majesty's heart at ease. Therefore our rules are as follows. 
ITEM: Extending great justice to all the country as our goal, we shall avoid trivialities. 
ITEM: As though traveling across the sea in the same boat, we will be with trust and 
move with justice. 
ITEM: If there is a case of emergency, neighboring domains are to promptly provide 
assistance and notify the government-general. 
ITEM: Let none rely on brute strength or bully the weak. Let there not be plans for 
private gain. Let there not be leaking of secret matters. Let there be no one who leaves the 
Alliance. 
ITEM: Though fortifications are built and provisions transported, even though it is 
inconvenient, the peasants are not to be made to toil and suffer pointlessly. 
ITEM: Major incidents shall be decided with the deliberation of the entire Alliance, with 
intent to return to a principle of fairness. By virtue of the agreement being solid, the details will 
naturally fall into place. 
ITEM: Plans with other provinces or troop deployments to neighboring borders, must be 
done with notification to the entire Alliance. 
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ITEM: Let there not be slaughtering of innocents. Let there not be plundering of money 
and grain. Those who follow the path of injustice shall be met with severe punishment. 
In the case that these rules are disregarded, let the Alliance, gathered in council, visit severe 
punishment [on the offender]. 
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Appendix B: The Full Invitation Message of i4/4171 
 
Our lords Mutsu-no-kami172 and Danjō-daihitsu173 have been ordered to form the vanguard of 
the attack on Katamori of Aizu. Lord Mutsu-no-kami has been dispatched already, but as 
Katamori's retainers have come to his encampment with a petition of surrender and apology, 
we would like to invite group discussion on this. Therefore we ask that you send men from 
among your senior officials to Shiroishi as soon as possible. 
 
i4/4 
 
Retainers of Uesugi Danjō-daihitsu TAKEMATA MIMASAKA, CHISAKA TARŌZAEMON 
Retainers of Date Mutsu-no-kami TADAKI TOSA, SAKA EIRIKI 
 
To the karō of each han 
Attention:174 
Nanbu Mino-no-kami, Nanbu Tōtōmi-no-kami, Nanbu Mimasaka-no-kami, Tsugaru Shikibu-day , 
Matsumae Izu-no-kami, Tsugaru Etch -no-kami, Matsudaira Daigaku-no-kami, Abe Mimasaka-
no-kami, Sōma Inaba-no-kami, Akita Mannosuke, Andō Riichirō, Itakura Kai-no-kami, Naitō 
Chōjūmaru, Tachibana Izumo-no-kami, Niwa Sakyō-day , Tozawa Nakatsukasa-day , Mizuno 
Shinjirō, Fujii Izu-no-kami, Rokugō Hyōgo-no-kami, Honda Noto-no-kami, Yonezu Ise-no-kami, 
Uesugi Suruga-no-kami, Oda Sakon-no-Shōgen, Iwaki Sakyō-day , Satake Ukyō-day , Satake 
Harima-no-kami, Ikoma Ōkura 
Total 27 Domains 
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 Date Yoshikuni of Sendai-han. 
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 Uesugi Narinori of Yonezawa-han. 
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 The names that follow are the names of the daimyo whose karō were invited: Nanbu Toshihisa of Morioka-han, 
Nanbu Nobuyuki of Hachinohe-han, Nanbu Nobutami of Shichinohe-han, Tsugaru Tsugumichi of Kuroishi-han, 
Matsumae Norihiro of Matsumae-han, Tsugaru Tsuguakira of Hirosaki-han, Matsudaira Yorinori of Moriyama-
han, Abe Masakiyo of Tanagura-han, Sōma Tomotane of Nakamura-han, Akita Akisue of Miharu-han, Andō 
Nobutake of Iwakidaira-han, Itakura Katsuhisa of Fukushima-han, Naitō Masayasu of Yunagaya-han, Tachibana 
Taneyuki of Shimotedo-han, Niwa Nagakuni of Nihonmatsu-han, Tozawa Masazane of Shinjō-han, Mizuno 
Tadahiro of Yamagata-han, Matsudaira (Fujii) Nobutsune of Kaminoyama-han, Rokugō Masakane of Honjō-han, 
Honda Tadatoshi of Izumi-han, Yonezu Masatoshi of Nagatoro-han, Uesugi Katsumichi of Yonezawa Shinden-
han, Oda Nobutoshi of Tendō-han, Iwaki Takakuni of Kameda-han, Satake Yoshitaka of Akita-han, Satake 
Yoshimichi of Akita Shinden-han, and Ikoma Chikayuki of Yajima-han. 
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Appendix C: Brief Timeline, 1868 
 
First Month: 
 
[3] (Monday, January 27, 1868): Battle of Toba-Fushimi, start of the Boshin War.175 
 
[10] (Monday, February 3, 1868): The imperial court strips the court rank of ex-shogun 
Tokugawa Yoshinobu, Aizu-han daimyo Matsudaira Katamori, Kuwana-han daimyo Matsudaira 
Sadaaki, and Matsuyama-han daimyo Itakura Katsukiyo, as well as 24 others176 and confiscates 
their estates (yashiki) in Kyoto.177 
 
Fourth Month 
 
[10] (Saturday, May 2, 1868): Aizu and Shōnai form a defensive alliance (not part of the 
Northern Alliance).178 
 
[11] (Sunday, May 3, 1868): Edo Castle surrendered to the imperial army.179 Sendai-han deploys 
troops as part of the imperial army, bearing the imperial banner, to attack Aizu.180 This is the 
last occurrence of the Date clan’s old battle deployment ritual.181 
 
Intercalary Fourth Month: 
 
[4] (Monday, May 25, 1868): Clan elders of Sendai-han and Yonezawa-han send an invitation for 
delegates from the northeastern domains to gather for a conference at Shiroishi. 182 
 
[11] (Monday, June 1, 1868): Shiroishi Interdomainal Assembly opens at Shiroishi Castle under 
the leadership of Date Yoshikuni. 183 
 
Fifth Month: 
 
[3] (Monday, June 22, 1868): Alliance established as Ōu Reppandōmei, encompassing domains 
of Mutsu and Dewa Provinces. 184 
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[6] (Thursday, June 25, 1868): Six domains of northern Echigo Province join the Alliance, making 
it the Ōuetsu (Mutsu-Dewa-Echigo) Reppandōmei.185 
 
[8] (Saturday, June 27, 1868): Date Yoshikuni issues a letter to the warriors and commoners of 
Sendai-han.186 
 
Sixth Month: 
 
[15] (Monday, August 3, 1868): Northern Alliance changes era name (    ō) to Taisei, and 
installs Prince     ōj -no-miya Kōgen, erstwhile abbot of Kan’ei-ji in Edo, as the Emperor 
Tōbu.187 
 
*16+ (Tuesday, August 4, 1868): Emperor Tōbu named head (meishu 盟主) of the Alliance.188 
 
Seventh Month: 
 
[4] (Friday, August 21, 1868): Akita-han retainers kill Sendai-han messengers staying in the Akita 
castle town;189 Akita-han leaves the Alliance.190 
 
[7] (Monday, August 24, 1868): Alliance issues a statement to foreign representatives in 
Japan.191 
 
[16] (Wednesday, September 2, 1868): Miharu-han turns against the Alliance.192 
 
[29] (Tuesday, September 15, 1868): Nihonmatsu Castle and Nagaoka Castle fall.193 
 
Eighth Month: 
 
[23] (Thursday, October 8, 1868): Siege of Aizuwakamatsu begins. 194 
 
[28] (Tuesday, October 13, 1868): Yonezawa-han surrenders.195 
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Ninth Month: 
 
[3] (Sunday, October 18, 1868): Last major Northern Alliance war council held at Sendai 
Castle.196 New York Times reports on accession of the “new mikado,” Emperor Tōbu.197 
 
[15] (Friday, October 30, 1868): Sendai-han surrenders.198 Effective end of the Northern 
Alliance.199 
 
[22] (Friday, November 6, 1868): Aizu-han surrenders.200 Emperor Tōbu relinquishes his rank 
and title.201 
 
[23] (Saturday, November 7, 1868): Shōnai-han surrenders.202 
 
[24] (Sunday, November 8, 1868): Morioka-han surrenders.203 
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